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On the Utopian/Dystopian Equivalence Between Functions and Experience
In his notebooks on psychology Paul Valéry called for a thought experiment:
Imagine a person whose entire experience were changed into functions. He would be the scientific 
being par excellence. Would he not be troubled by these innumerable functions? A person who 
would not forget the cards already played and would deduce the opponent's play. 
Intellect is simply the activity which substitutes for this infinity, the use and organization of a 
limited number of functions. Or rather which transforms experiences into functions. (Psych. 111-
112)
The scenario laid out in the passage and its provocation depends on the assumption of a disparity 
between the undenumerable multiplicity that composes experience, and the intrinsic finitude of the 
functions that can be carried out by human psychophysiology. This way the commutability 
introduced between experience and function works first to position the innumerably diverse and 
incorrigibly relational experiences as potentially permanent acquisitions for an individual. One can 
take this as a creative metabolization of experience, which finds itself incorporated and to have 
taken the path from relation to possession/predicate. 
Say you have found a rare capacity to feel sympathy for a stranger's predicament thanks to an 
elusive combination of the right circumstances, for instance your day went unexpectedly well, and 
that stale aura of personal dissatisfaction lifted off your shoulders a bit, making you particularly 
open to connect with others. Valéry seems to imagine this and similar types of experience turning 
into ever dependable functions, only needing wilful insertion. A sort of characterological alchemy, 
which can create both heaven and hell for the one who holds its key, as the contrary scenario of 
somebody cutting in front of you in the line will make you a ''gift'' or aptitude for permanent 
impotent anger.
By the same token, namely the regularizing tendency of dependability in function, the same person 
whose experiences turn into functions may become the master of circumstance, and in Valéry's 
parlance a ''scientific being par excellence''. After all a good part of science is ensuring the 
repeatability of a set of circumstances to isolate acting causes, and this seems to be exactly what is 
done by this imaginary person--experiences in their unpredictable arrival, magically turning into an 
infinity of capacities. 
Not so unexpectedly, in an example of a certain rationalist inspiration that characterizes a good part 
of his work, Valéry takes the intellect as an emblem of this whole relation of commutability, the 
single main function to collect and appropriate all the experiences, giving them the form of 
permanence. One ring to rule them, yes.
Seeing the way Valéry leads perhaps an initially more enticing and fruitful reflection toward a 
familiar image of intellectual mastery over experience, one can of course ask whether this would 
not mean making up for what one loses in the freshness of experience in nothing more than the lack 
of this freshness. Even without being unjust toward the merits of intellect, one can concede a 
possible form of the conjunction between experience and function to be subtractive and destructive 
of value, ensuring the absorption of experience by a kingdom of functions, which works like a 
hypertrophied a priori in setting the terms of every transaction with the world. As Valéry is not 
charting the other side of the commutability, one can well imagine the exchange working in expense 
of experience.
Before exploring another possible form of this commutability which can restore a certain balance, it 
bears noting that Valéry's thought experiment has precursors, and thus historically privileged 
domains on which it finds formulation.  These domains are partly postKantian and partly 
naturphilosophical. To be more specific, it is not wrong to argue that Valéry revives a problem 
whose real jurisdiction falls between a thought of metaphysical organ and a thought of metaphysical 
experience.
Among Valéry's many overlaps with the kindred spirit Novalis, an interest in a generalized sense of 
organs-instruments figures large. Especially, both approached language as a vital instrument or 
organ for exploring and maintaning the possibility of thought. Thus one cannot read Novalis' 
declaration that ''Everything can become an experiment—everything an organ'' and not see an 
earlier iteration of Valéry's thought experiment, which differs from the Novalis fragment only 
through a more rationalist twist. In a positive vein the quote by Novalis already brings a necessary 
reversal to the imaginary commutation Valéry establishes: instead of resulting in a loss of 
experience through the regularizing thrust of function, it envisions a becoming experimental of the 
organ, a trojan horse of wonder and experiment to trasmute everyday function itself, a side of the 
equation never sufficiently stressed by Valéry.
Positioned this way, in its striking resemblance to Novalis' earlier utterance about the organ-
experiment, Valéry's translation between experience and functions may also turn out to imply a 
question of possibility. After all isn't talking about function absorbing experience also talking about 
a congelation of the possibility immanent in the experience, which turns into an inalienable 
acquisition? An inalienable acquisition which used to be known as the apriori... As Jean Wahl wrote 
about some of Novalis' other affirmations--poetic realization of the universe for instance-- 
''experience shows us in itself the presence of the a priori, of the magical, of the voluntary.'' As a 
priori becomes a matter to be negotiated in experience, it loses something of its universality and 
rigidity. On a similar note, Leif Weatherby in his turn notes that Novalis ''insists on the history of 
possibility... indeed on the possibility of possibility'', provided it also incorporates the sense of ''the 
history of the a priori''.
The thought experiment's scenario of a function acquiring experience thus makes provision for 
nothing less than a historical structuration of the a priori, those necessary, binding, and precisely 
inalienable determinants of any access to the world. Considering how both Valéry's function, and 
Novalis' organ suggest certain links with a naturalism of cognition, it would not be a strech to find 
here a transfigured a priori, anticipating the dreams of certain physiologists who unwittingly made 
common cause with these poets with heightened clinical sensibilities. In Warren McCulloch's 
account, the German physiologist Rudolf Magnus took the a priori as ''the mode of action of those 
mechanisms which worked to determine the three - dimensional nature of our world, its axes and 
Angles, and which give us a feeling for speed and acceleration, from which we have largely derived 
our concept of time''. 
The underspecification and the lack of acknowledgement of a historical dimension here might be 
remedied by the ambitions of another doctor like Joseph Knoll, whose philosophical proclivities 
must have been closer to the concerns of  traditional empiricism, with the premium it places on 
questions of habit. According to Andrew Lees, Joseph Knoll conducted experiments on the way 
''novel experiences'' get transformed into ''acquired drives and ingrained habits'', fulfilling Valéry's 
rather than Novalis' preferred emphasis on the ambiguous scenario of translation. In other words, 
seeing Knoll's experiment in the light of Valéry's fiction of metabolized and functionalized 
experience, may also make Valéry's acquired ''function'' and experientially transformed a  priori 
communicate with a problem of habituation. In fact What conceivable physiological function is 
there, independent of repetition, and what repetition independent of habit? 
Rewinding to that point where I situated Valéry's fiction in a locus between metaphysical organ and 
metaphysical experience, it is now time to provide the remaining coordinates of this attempt at 
conceptual mapping, which are supplied from the metaphysical experience side. This is also a 
simultaneous return to Novalis' symmetrical reversal, raising the issue of bestowing on everyday 
functions a refreshingly experimental character. As there may not in fact be a better way to 
introduce experiment to everyday organs and functions than art, here I turn to an insight on 
metaphysical experience in its relation to art. 
Commenting on the difficult question of Adorno's investment in the category of metaphysical 
experience, Jay Bernstein elucidates the stakes of that strange association Adorno makes between 
art and the survival of metaphysical experience in a disenchanted Post -World War II world. 
Bernstein notes that the art Adorno champions fits this picture as an unremittingly materialist twist 
on metaphysical experience. What is striking is that Bernstein also relies on this strange idea of a 
''possibility of possibility'', seeming to arrive at a similar constellation of interests as Weatherby, 
who mentions the term around organs however: ''the question of aesthetic semblance is the question 
of the possibility of possibility, of a conception of possible experience that transcends what is now 
taken to be the parameters of possible experience'' (Bernstein). It all but needs a tiny prodding to 
argue for the noncoincidental nature of this convergence on the possibility of possibility.
Whereas Weatherby, through Novalis, assigns the status of the possibility of possibility to 
historically thus experientially transformed metaphysical organs for knowing and feeling, Bernstein 
and Adorno assign the same status to the way the aesthetic serves as a medium of experience 
exceeding the demands and regimentations of a legislating understanding.
After this necessary detour, we are in a position to read  Valéry's thought experiment as a potential 
contribution to any  reconciliation between a thought of organs and functions, and a thought of 
metaphysical experience.  
The organs and functions dreamt by science fiction or speculative fiction for instance, would not be 
outside the ambit of the maneuvre intended here. A classic for this genre like Ursula Le Guin's Left 
Hand of Darkness offers a great exampe of this author's own prolonged exploration of relationally 
inflected mental powers, functions subsuming experiences and themselves becoming experimental 
in turn. In a brilliant yet characteristic reversal for Le Guin, a not-so technologically developed 
civilization has at its disposal an equally valuable function or power non-obtainable by 
technological means, honed collectively by successive transmissions and apprenticeships. Here this 
function-experience/organ-experiment is called foretelling, which involves making an art or 
